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Empirical Research on Corporate Credit-Ratings:
A Literature Review∗
Alexander B. Matthies†
Abstract
We report on the current state and important older findings of empirical studies
on corporate credit ratings and their relationship to ratings of other entities. Spe-
cifically, we consider the results of three lines of research: The correlation of credit
ratings and corporate default, the influence of ratings on capital markets, and the
determinants of credit ratings and rating changes.
Results from each individual line are important and relevant for the construction
and interpretation of studies in the other two fields, e.g. the choice of statistical
methods. Moreover, design and construct of credit ratings and the credit rating
scale are essential to understand empirical findings.
Keywords: Rating agency; Credit Ratings; Through-the-cycle rating methodology; Corporate
Governance
JEL classification: G20; G30; G32; G24; G34
1 Introduction
Credit ratings aim to measure the creditworthiness of an entity (e.g. a corporation). They
represent an opinion of a rating agency that evaluates the fundamental credit strength of
an issuer and his ability to fully and punctually meet his debt obligations (Gonzales et
al. (2004), Berblinger (1996) p. 11, and Wappenschmidt (2009)).
Credit ratings are produced by professional rating agencies. In the US and the EU
regulatory norms exist that agencies must fulfil. For instance, in the US, agencies must
be approved as nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSRO) by the se-
curities and exchange commission (SEC) (Hill (2004)). In an economic sense, rating
agencies function as financial intermediaries (Ramakrishan & Thakor (1984)) whose ex-
istence would not be justifiable under the hypothesis of strictly efficient markets. The
market for ratings has an oligopoly structure as the three leading agencies ‘Moody’s’,
‘Standard & Poor’s’ (S&P), and ‘Fitch Publishing Company’ control around 95% of the
market (Asmussen (2005), Wappenschmidt (2009) p. 13).
Ratings exist for a wide variety of issuers such as corporations, countries, and struc-
tured finance products. Banks approve loans and credits (Krahnen (2001) p. 1767) on the
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basis of internal ratings. These so called ‘shadow ratings’ are distinct from the ratings
provided by professional rating agencies. The ratings of agencies can be further divided
into solicited (commissioned and paid for by the issuer) and unsolicited ratings (Poon
(2003), Poon & Firth (2005), Bannier et al. (2010)). Ratings are placed on a discrete
ordinal scale, where for example under the S&P scale an AAA (the so called ‘triple A’)
rating is the highest credit rating assigned to issuers with the highest credit-quality and
a D rating is the lowest rating assigned to bonds or firms in default.
Corporate, sovereign, and structured finance products have historically behaved dif-
ferently (Benmelech & Dlugozs (2010)). The current crisis is largely due to bonds of
sovereigns and structured finance products. In this context, empirical results of corporate
ratings serve as a benchmark to understand those of other entities.
Agencies insist that ratings are opinions and not recommendations to buy, sell, or
hold. Nevertheless, financial regulation in the US and the EU is often based on these
ratings (Gonzales et al. (2004)). Overall, ratings are a highly aggregated classification of
an issuers debt that can inform a third party on the possibility that the issuers will not
be able to meet his obligations (default) (Dilly & Ma¨hlmann (2010)). On the other hand,
issuers can use ratings as a mechanism of corporate governance to signal low investment
risk and transparency (Nordberg (2011) p. 60). Ratings can, in this sense, solve principal
agent problems (Gonzales et al. (2004)). In return issuers achieve access to the debt
market and can reduce capital costs, as a higher rating reduces the yield spread to a risk
free investment (Gonzales et al. (2004)). Potential investors and banks can use ratings
as benchmarks for comparisons with their own analysis and internal ratings (Erlenmaier
(2006) p. 39).
Credit ratings are produced by using public and confidential information. Agencies
employ a firm’s financial statements, franchise value, management quality, and consider its
competitive position under different possible economic scenarios to form their judgement
(Gonzales et al. (2004)). They attempt to asses the long term quality of a corporation.
They therefore, take a through-the-cycle approach in contrast to a more point-in-time
perspective (Amato & Furfine (2004) and Altman & Rijken (2006)). The through-the-
cycle approach means that agencies try to form their opinion independently of short term
business cycle effects. Point-in-time estimations of default probabilities are based on
Merton-type models (based on Merton (1974)) which present more of a short term risk
assessments (Gonzales et al. (2004)).
In the wake of numerous false assessments of credit quality in individual cases (e.g. En-
ron and Lehman Brothers, see Hill (2004), Lo¨ffler (2005), Gu¨ttler & Wahrenburg (2007),
and Gopalan et al. (2009)), possible systematic errors in the market for structured finance
products (Benmelech & Dlugosz (2010)), and the current sovereign rating crisis in Europe,
the regulation and practices of agencies have come into the focus of public debate. In
Europe the possible creation of an European rating agency is being considered. Addition-
ally, agencies face further possible government reglementation and regulation (Stolper
(2009)). Yet, ratings remain a voluntary institution of capital markets. Nevertheless,
through regulation applicable for banks and fonds, ratings are effectively compulsory as
a monitoring mechanisms (mostly in the US) (White (2007), Opp et al. (2010)), and
form the basis of risk management (Nickel et al. (2000)) although there is no obligation
to publish credit ratings. Therefore, it is striking what influence these privately offered
measures, based on a censored calculation, have on capital markets. To illustrate, the
downgrade of a corporation can significantly increase its capital costs and influence its
stock price (Kisgen & Strahan (2010)).
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In the process of globalisation there are increasing ambitions to harmonise accounting
standards. As from 2005 all EU corporations are obliged to publish their financial state-
ments under the international financial accounting standards (IFRS). Similar steps have
also been taken in other industrial and developing countries. These steps are motivated
in principle by the conclusion that capital markets are not efficient (Fama (1970)) and
therefore regulatory measures ought to be taken to reduce information asymmetries. The
IFRS is designed to help approximate the market value of equity and serve the market
participants as a basis from which they can estimate the size and uncertainty of future
cash flows. Empirical studies that measure the information content of financial statements
find that they are a significant factor of capital market dynamics (e.g. Kothari (2001)). In
this sense, the assessment of creditworthiness via ratings and the publication of accounting
data serve similar purposes. Credit ratings aim to reflect the default probability of a firm
in a single item and financial statements should fairly present the economic situation of a
firm. Therefore, ratings and financial statements are alternative information instruments
for market participants. Yet the obligational character of financial statements and the non
obligational character of ratings force one to reflect to what degree ratings are determined
by financial statements. Ratings would be redundant if they could be reproduced with
financial statements, corporate governance characteristics, and macroeconomic variables.
This paper reviews the empirical studies conducted on credit ratings in the context of
international capital markets and their relationship to financial statements. Moreover, we
highlight the statistical properties of credit ratings and how these properties are essential
to understanding credit ratings. The function and properties of ratings are crucial to for-
mulating and imposing global and concrete regulation on financial markets. Furthermore,
market participants need to understand ratings and their relationship to other measures
of default in order to apply them.
Empirical studies on credit ratings can be roughly divided into three lines of research
(Blume et al. (1998)). The first two measure the information content of credit ratings
in different ways. The first line analyses whether credit ratings measure what they claim
to measure, i.e. an issuers creditworthiness. More specifically, the relationship of ratings
and corporate default is measured (Zhou (2001) and Jorion & Zhang (2007)). The second
line measures the information content of ratings on capital markets. Here, capital market
reactions around rating changes are analysed to see if ratings contain additional inform-
ation (for a review see Gonzales et al. (2004)). The third line of research investigates
the determinants of credit ratings. Here ratings as independent variables are modeled on
a number of financial data (e.g. Ederington (1985)), corporate governance characteristics
(Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003)), and macroeconomic factors (e.g. Amato & Furfine (2004)).
These studies show that ratings can be replicated to a certain degree solely using pub-
licly available data. Further studies in this context analyse the stability of credit ratings
with respect to their ’through–the–cycle’ approach (Altman & Rijken (2006)) and the de-
termining factors of rating changes and transition probabilities (e.g. Lando & Skødeberg
(2002) and Koopman et al. (2008)).
This paper continues as follows: in Section 2 we review the results of studies that
investigate the relationship of ratings and default frequencies. The main finding is that
ratings correlate on average negatively with future default rates, e.g. a firm with the
highest rating AAA is less likely to default in the future than one with a B rating. In
Section 3 we present the major findings of studies investigating the information content
of ratings on capital markets. The results show that the characteristic and structure
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of the rating scale is crucial. Specifically, market reactions are asymmetrical, i.e. prices
react differently to downgrades than to upgrades. Section 4 provides a review of empirical
studies measuring the determinants of credit ratings. Ratings depend on financial ratios,
firm size, corporate governance mechanisms, and macroeconomic variables. Section 5
surveys the statistical methods used in the studies presented in Section 4 to estimate
and predict credit ratings. As in Section 3 we find that the character of the rating scale
is an important feature in method selection. Section 6 reviews studies that analyse the
empirical properties of rating transitions. We find that transitions, like capital market
reactions, have asymmetrical features. Section 7 concludes.
2 Credit ratings and defaults
The informativeness of credit ratings can be basically measured in two ways. First, one
can relate ratings within the same class to the frequency of default. The second is to
investigate the information content of changes in credit ratings on the adjustment process
of prices and returns of bonds and stocks (Jorion & Zhang (2007)). The results of the
latter line of inquiry are discussed later in Section 3. We first analyse the results of the
former line.
Historic default frequencies can be used as estimates for default probabilities of indi-
vidual rating categories. Agencies do not assign a specific default probability to individual
rating categories but define them as with regard to credit quality.
2.1 One year default rates
Rating agencies like Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s provide regular studies that relate
their credit rating to the frequency of default in fixed cohorts. Zhou (2001) provides an
extensive study of yearly default rates for Moody’s rating from 1971 to 2000. Furthermore,
studies estimating transition matrices (explained in detail below in Section 6) calculate
transition frequencies to default for all S&P rating categories (e.g. Nickel et al. (2000)
and Lando & Skødeberg (2002)), which are used as proxies for default probabilities.
Rating scales are not cardinal but ordinal, i.e. the difference in credit quality between
an AAA rated firm and an AA rated firm is not the same as between an AA and an A
rated firm. The difference in quality increases with each category down the scale. This
feature is reflected in the measured default frequencies of the individual categories. For
example, over an 18 year period from 1971 to 1988 there are no one year defaults in the
Aaa and Aa categories (Zhou (2001)).
Ro¨sch (2005) compares default risk forecasts of different rating philosophies. Specific-
ally, the point-in-time and through-the-cycle approaches (more on that in Section 4.3).
The through-the-cycle approach gives a certain amount of independence from the busi-
ness cycle. Yet defaults are an objective event and therefore independent of the rating
approach and thus default rates vary across the business cycle (Nickel et al. (2000)).
Moreover, macroeconomic and sectorial shocks cause default rates to vary across bond
market sectors for long time spans (Cantor & Falkenstein (2001)). Specifically, Cantor &
Falkenstein (2001) find that discrepant default rates in different sectors and geographic
regions are often caused by shocks in small samples.
Short-term interval horizons can cause estimated default probabilities to increase non-
uniformly. In contrast, longer horizons produce smoother patterns (Jorion & Zhang
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(2007)). Furthermore, one year default rates correlate with the business cycle (Nickel
et al. (2000) and Zhou (2001)) and may therefore be an inaccurate estimate of a categor-
ies default probability.
2.2 Multi year default rates
Multi year default rates correlate less with the business cycle and are therefore more
likely to reflect the agencies ’through–the–cycle’ approach. In order to present the default
frequency of a particular rating class Jorion & Zhang (2007) and Zhou (2001) analyse
multi year default rates for S&P and Moody’s respectively.
Table 1 presents the average 8 year (Moody’s) and 10 year (S&P) cumulative default
rates from 1983 to 1998 (Moody’s) and 1981 to 2002 (S&P). The default rates for S&P
ratings increase smoother than those of Moody’s. This discrepancy could be caused by
the lower horizon in the Moody’s set or it might indicate that S&P ratings are more
accurate than Moody’s. Nevertheless there are common striking features worth noting.
The statistics highlight a crucial feature of credit ratings. Different downgrades can
correspond to different changes in default probability. For example, default rates for AA-
and Aa3 are about 1%, below 5% for A- and A3, and around 10% for BBB- and Baa3.
This means, for instance, under the S&P scale a downgrade from AAA to A- over 6
notches presents a smaller change in default probability than a downgrade from BBB- to
BB+ over 1 notch. The ordinality of the rating scale is an essential characteristic and
a key component in understanding empirical observations of ratings and how to apply
them, and crucial in evaluating credit rating related research.
Rating Default frequency
S&P Moody’s
AAA/Aaa 0.005 0.005
AA+/Aa1 0.004 0.004
AA/Aa2 0.007 0.009
AA-/Aa3 0.012 0.006
A+/A1 0.016 0.011
A/A2 0.017 0.014
A-/A3 0.023 0.010
BBB+/Baa1 0.047 0.024
BBB/Baa2 0.055 0.024
BBB-/Baa3 0.109 0.054
BB+/Ba1 0.140 0.143
BB/Ba2 0.187 0.138
BB-/Ba3 0.265 0.324
B+/B1 0.315 0.397
B/B2 0.396 0.343
B-/B3 0.492 0.483
CCC 0.572 –
Time period 1981 – 2002 1983 – 1998
Table 1: Default frequencies of rating categories of Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s
(Sources Jorion & Zhang (2007) and Zouh (2001)).
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In total, one year default rates correlate with the business cycle, whereas multi year de-
fault rates reflect more the through-the-cycle approach of rating agencies. Both statistics
nevertheless stress the ordinal character of the rating scale.
3 Capital market reactions
Ratings have an effect on capital markets, influencing them directly and/or indirectly
through rating based regulation. The direct effect of ratings on yields implies that rat-
ings contain information that is publicly unavailable, and that markets are therefore not
efficient. In this sense, empirical studies on market dynamics test the theoretical concept
of market efficiency. Further determinants of bond prices are taxation, systematic risk,
volatility, supply and demand, and liquidity (Gonzales et al. (2004)).
3.1 Information content
The effect of credit ratings on capital markets has been analysed over a long time in highly
aggregated studies. Empirically, the influence of ratings has been measured on the price or
return of bonds (Katz (1974), Ederington et al. (1987), Goh & Ederington (1999)), stocks
(Pinches & Singelton (1978), Holthausen & Leftwich (1986), Followill & Martell (1997),
Jorion et al. (2005), Jorion & Zhang (2007)), and more recently credit default swaps
(Micu et al. (2004), Carthart et al. (2010)). The focus in these research papers is on
the big rating agencies and on the US in geographic terms. A few individual studies have
also analysed the European market (Gropp & Richards (2001), Cesare (2006)) and single
countries, e.g. the UK (Barron et al. (1997) and Batchelor & Manzoni (2006)), Germany
(Steiner & Heinke (2001)), and Spain (Abad–Romero & Robles–Ferna´ndez (2006) and
(2007)).
Specifically, Katz (1974) finds that investors react to ratings as they react to new
information. He performs an event study to test the efficiency of the bond market by
analysing the price adjustment of bonds around rating changes. The expected yields of
bonds are forecasted for their old and new rating classes. Katz finds no anticipation of
the rating change prior to the announcement, implying that bond holders rely on the
judgement of rating agencies and that the bond market is inefficient.
These results would justify the existence of rating agencies as financial intermediaries.
Ederington et al. (1987) show that investors use ratings and accounting data to form
their decisions. Furthermore, they find that ratings provide information beyond that of
accounting statistics. Corporations often acquire two ratings. This is a way in which the
rating market is informally regulated, the so called ‘two rating regime’ (White (2004)).
Kish et al. (1999) test if markets value ratings of S&P and Moody’s differently. They
find diverging effects but can not show that one rating agency is more informative than
the other.
Beyond the bond market ratings also lead to price adjustment processes on other
markets underscoring their importance for market participants. Pinches & Singelton
(1978) analyse the movement of stock prices around rating changes. They conclude that
agencies lag behind the market which implies that ratings add no additional information
to stock markets. Rating agencies actions are not limited to rating changes, but also
include placements on watch lists and review announcements. Holthausen & Leftwich
(1986) measure an effect on the stock market when S&P places a firm on its credit watch
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list. Similarly, Followill & Martell (1997) show that after announcements have an effect
on the stock market, the effect of the actual rating change is negligible. The additional
informational content of ratings depends also on how much more information agencies
have than most market participants. Jorion et al. (2005) show that since the passing of
the Fair Disclosure regulation in 2000 in the US, which gives agencies access to confidential
information, ratings have a stronger effect on stock markets than before.
The choice of investing in either equity or debt is a central issue in corporate governance
(Shleifer & Vishny (1997)). Barron et al. (1997) argues that, due to wealth redistribution
effects from bond holders to stock holders, rating downgrades could increase stock returns
in some cases. In this case, losses on the bond market would not lead to losses on stock
markets. Abdad-Romero & Roles-Ferna´ndez (2006) and (2007) argue that because stock
prices on Spanish markets react negatively to both downgrades and upgrades there could
be a wealth redistribution effect in the opposite direction from stock holders to bond
holders. Alternatively, the discrepant market reactions might also be influenced by other
factors. For instance, Gropp & Richards (2001) find no announcement effects for rating
changes of European banks on the bond market but strong effects on the stock market.
They suggest that this could be due to insufficient liquidity on the bond market.
Micu et al. (2004) find that rating changes cause dynamics on CDS markets. Cesare
(2006) measures if market based indicators can predict rating changes. Consistent with
other studies, he finds that ratings still add information to the market although measures
based on bond prices, stock prices, and CDS anticipate downgrades. Specifically, CDS
are good indicators for negative and stock for positive events. Rating changes of one firm
can also influence other firms in the same sector. Cathcart et al. (2010) show that stock
and CDS returns correlate through industry effects.
Apart from the big rating agencies, there are many rating agencies that operate mostly
in specific sectors or regions. Li et al. (2006) compare the influence of two local Japanese
agencies with that of Moody’s and S&P on Japanese stock markets. They find that the
influence of Moody’s and S&P is greater.
The lagging of actual rating changes to movements on markets and market based
measures highlights the through-the-cycle approach of agencies. This gap to point-in-
time approaches could be closed by the use of outlooks and reviews (watch lists) (Altman
& Rijken (2007)). Furthermore, the results of experimental analysis by Ferri & Morone
(2008) suggest that agencies can prevent herding behaviour and increase price conver-
gence.
Overall, rating agencies seem to provide additional information to market participants.
At least market participants, either through free will or forced by regulation, will act on
ratings. This does not definitely answer if markets are not efficient, but at least market
participants act as if they are not.
3.2 Asymmetrical effects
Market reactions are asymmetrical, especially those of stock prices. Specifically, markets
react stronger to downgrades than to upgrades (Gonzales et al. (2004)). Downgrades
have an empirically significant impact on stock prices in all studies, unlike upgrades that
have no effect in most studies, e.g. Holthausen & Leftwich (1986) and Dichev & Pitroski
(2001). This would imply that downgrades contain valuable information but upgrades do
not.
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Jorion & Zhang (2007) provide a theoretical basis for different price effects as a non-
linear function of the rating prior to the announcement of the rating change. Here the
change in default probability and the change in stock price are linked using a structural
Merton-type model. Prior studies implicitly assumed an equal change in default probabil-
ity for all rating changes, which is false (see Section 2). Jorion & Zhang (2007) show that,
after including the prior rating to forecast price reactions, upgrades also have a significant
effect on stock prices. Yet this effect is still smaller than that of downgrades.
This discrepancy in the effects of downgrades and upgrades might be due to several
causes. It might be that rating agencies spend more resources to detect credit deterioration
and firms are more willing to make positive information public (Jorion & Zhang (2007)).
Downgrades may therefore — in contrast to upgrades — contain additional information
that is not publicly available (Gonzales et al. (2004)). It could also be possible that
stock markets overreact to downgrades (Dichev & Pitroski (2001)). A further reason may
be the way in which rating agencies operate. As Altman & Rijken (2006) note, one of
the consequences of the ‘through-the-cycle’ method of rating agencies is that agencies
adjust their ratings upwards slower than their downgrades compared to more ‘point-
in-time’ Merton-type methods. Another reason might be the observed correlation of
ratings and the business cycle (Amato & Furfine (2004)). Bar-Isaac & Sharpio (2010)
provide a theoretical model for the quality of ratings. It suggests that the quality of
ratings decreases in boom phases of the business cycle. As upgrades are more likely to
occur during economic expansions, the quality and therefore the information content of
upgrades would be lower. Upgrades would then, on average, have a smaller impact on
market reactions.
In a similar line of research empirical studies test the information content of financial
statements. Financial statements can cause similar effects on capital markets as ratings
do (for an empirical review see Mo¨lls & Strauß (2007)). In the next section, we discuss
that financial statements are basic determinants of corporate credit ratings. Therefore
accounting data and credit ratings can be seen as alternative and even competing mech-
anisms to reduce information asymmetries on capital markets.
To conclude, it is found that capital markets react to credit rating changes, implying
that markets are not efficient. Moreover, reactions are asymmetrical, i.e. stronger for
downgrades than for upgrades. This finding holds even after allowing for the actual
change in default probability that differs over rating classes due to the ordinal structure
of the rating scale.
4 Determinants of credit ratings
The determinants of credit ratings fall into three main categories. The first are financial
ratios and financial data. These variables proxy firm specific factors such as leverage,
liquidity, and firm size (e.g. Ederington (1985), Kamstra et al. (2001), and Blume et al.
(1998)). The second category are corporate governance mechanisms. Here, factors such as
ownership structure and board independence are measured (Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003)
and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.(2006)). The third group comprises macroeconomic factors that
could influence credit ratings like GDP growth measures (e.g. Amato & Furfine (2004)).
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4.1 Financial statements and financial ratios
Financial ratios are easily obtainable from financial statements and are therefore publicly
available information that determine corporate credit ratings. They are also traditionally
applied in default prediction studies (e.g. Altman (1968)), which are similar to rating
prediction and estimation studies. The ratios represent factors such as leverage, liquidity,
interest coverage, and profitability that determine a firm’s creditworthiness. Similarly,
the firm’s size also contributes to its default probability and creditworthiness.
4.1.1 Financial ratios and default probability
Altman (1968) uses five ratios, similar to those used in rating studies, to predict bank-
ruptcy: working capital/total assets, retained earnings/total assets, earnings before in-
terest and taxes/total assets, market value of equity/book value of total assets, and sales/total
assets. He highlights their possible impact on default probability, and therefore on ratings
too. The working capital total assets ratio is a measure of net liquid assets of the firm
relative to its capitalisation. A firm that experiences operational losses will have shrink-
ing current assets in relation to its total assets. Without liquidity it will not be able to
continue operations, or repay its debt. Therefore, this ratio should be positively related
to credit ratings, i.e. the higher the ratio is ceteris paribus the better the firm’s rating.
The retained earnings total assets ratio is a measure of cumulative profitability over
time, implicitly this also measures the age of a firm. Younger firms are more likely to fail
than older firms and usually have a low retained earnings total assets ratio. The retained
earnings can be used in less profitable times and may ensure continued operations. The
ratio should therefore be positively correlated to credit ratings.
The earnings before interests and taxes total assets ratio is a measure of the productiv-
ity of the firm’s assets. A firm’s existence, including its creditworthiness, is based on the
earning power of its assets. The productivity of a firm should therefore be positively
related to credit ratings.
The market value of equity to book value of total debt ratio measures how much the
firm’s assets may decline in value before its liabilities exceed its assets and the firm could
become insolvent. The ratio is therefore positively related to credit ratings.
The sales total assets ratio measures the sales generating ability of the firm’s assets,
and thereby the capability of the management to deal in competitive situations. A good
management should decrease the probability of default and therefore be positively related
to credit ratings.
Altman (1968) finds statistically significant effects for all these variables in a default
prediction exercise. Kim & Sohn (2008) employ these ratios to predict rating transitions,
and also find a significant effect.
4.1.2 Determinants of ratings
The ratios of Altman (1968) are significant determinants of corporate bankruptcy. Similar
ratios and financial variables are employed to estimate and forecast ratings. Specifically,
Kaplan & Urwitz (1979) use interest coverage, the long term debt to total assets ratio,
the long term debt to net worth ratio, the net income to total assets ratio, the coefficient
of variation of total assets, the coefficient of variation of net income, and total assets.
Ederington (1985) uses interest coverage, the long term debt to capital ratio, and total
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assets. Kamstra et al. (2001) use net income plus interest expenses divided by interest
expenses to represent interest coverage, a debt ratio measured by total debt divided by
total assets, profitability captured by the net income total assets ratio, and firm size
measured as book value of firm assets.
The financial ratios employed in these studies usually have a statistically significant
intuitive effect. Specifically, in Kamstra et al. (2001) the debt ratio is negatively related
and return on assets is positively related to credit ratings. The firm’s size equally signi-
ficantly improves ratings, i.e. on average larger firms will have better ratings. In contrast,
they are unable to find a statistically significant effect of the interest coverage, implying
that it does not determine credit ratings.
The stability of the determinant’s effects does change over the time span of the re-
lationship between firms and the rating agency. Ma¨hlmann (2011) shows that corporate
ratings improve the longer the relationship lasts although the default rates do not decrease.
4.1.3 Nonlinear effects and multicollinearity
Blume et al. (1998) provide a more comprehensive study by estimating ratings in a panel
regression from 1978 to 1995. They examine whether the observed decline in the quality
of US corporate debt is due to more stringent rating standards. They employ ratios for
pre-tax interest coverage, operating income to sales, long term debt to assets, total debt
to assets, and total assets.
The findings are that the long term ratio is significantly related to credit ratings
whereas the total debt ratio is insignificant. This is puzzling as the total debt ratio should
be negatively related to credit ratings. An answer may lie in the high correlation of these
two variables. More specifically, the insignificance might be due to multicollinearity as
Amato & Furfine (2004) point out.
Motivated by the strong skewness in the distribution of interest coverage (a much
smaller average than median), Blume et al. (1998) allow for a nonlinear effect for interest
coverage. They show that interest coverage has a significantly positive effect for small
values and an insignificant one for larger values. This result explains the empirical findings
of Kamstra et al. (2001). Amato & Furfine (2004) confirm the basic finding that interest
coverage has a nonlinear influence.
Financial ratios are the basic determinants of credit quality. Studies that omit these
variables are almost incomplete by definition. The strong significance and effects that
are measured emphasise the strong correlation and dependence credit ratings and fin-
ancial statements have and underscore the observation that credit ratings and financial
statements are alternative measures of corporate default.
As Kamstra et al. (2001) point out, a problem of financial ratios is that factors such
as leadership quality, management ability, and technology changes are not captured or
are hard to proxy. Blume et al. (1998) and Amato & Furfine (2004) use β’s and standard
errors from market models to represent measures of management quality. Large β and
standard errors are associated with greater idiosyncratic risk and are therefore negatively
related to credit ratings. Yet, as we will see below, this is problematic. Blume et al. (1998)
omit measures of corporate governance to determine ratings that are crucial in assessing
the credit worthiness of corporations and question the use of market based indicators.
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4.2 Corporate governance
Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) point out that a firm’s likelihood of default depends on the
availability of credible information to evaluate the default risk and agency costs. Both of
these are determined by governance mechanisms. Corporate governance is essentially the
system by which firms are controlled and directed. Corporate governance is the focus of
much research (Brown et al. (2011)). Here the choice of investing as a bondholder or a
stockholder is one of the central issues (Shleifer & Vishny (1997)). The assessment of the
rating agency reflects the view of a debt owner.
Some studies measure the influence of corporate governance on firm performance.
A summary of the state of corporate governance research is provided by Bebchuck &
Weisbach (2010). Bhagat & Bolton (2008) find that governance as measured by the
Gompers et al. (2003) index is positively correlated with better operating performance.
Moreover, they argue that contrary to previous studies, governance measures are not
correlated with future stock market performance, if endogeneity is adequately addressed1.
The relationship of bond yields and corporate governance measures is highly correlated
to that of credit ratings and corporate governance. Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) show that
corporate governance measures that increase ratings also lower bond yields. Neverthe-
less, Moody’s and S&P ratings are not sufficient to explain spot rate curves and pricing
relationships completely (Elton et al. (2004)). Liu & Jiraporn (2010) find that higher
decision making power of CEO’s lowers ratings and increases yield spreads.
To value the efficiency of corporate governance, there are also some corporate gov-
ernance rating firms that seek to provide assistance to investors. The results of Daines
et al. (2010) suggest that these commercially available corporate governance rankings
provide no useful information to shareholders.
Under the agency theory framework of Jensen & Meckling (1976), bondholders face two
potential conflicts that can reduce the value of their claims by increasing the probability
of default. The first is that one between management and all stakeholders (equity and
debt), and the second one is that between bondholders (providing debt) and shareholders
(providing equity).
4.2.1 The principal agent problem
The separation of ownership and control leads to information asymmetry problems between
external stakeholders and managers. Managers that act selfishly can reduce expected cash
flows to the firm and its external stakeholders. As the cash flows decline, the default risk
increases and therefore effects a credit rating negatively. In this respect governance mech-
anisms that provide independent and effective monitoring of the management should
improve ratings. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) refer to this role as the management
disciplining hypothesis.
Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) distinguish two mechanisms through which governance
mechanisms effect credit ratings. The first is agency risk. This is the risk that management
acting in its self interest would take actions that deviate from firm value maximization, as
well as the risk that the manger is incompetent. The second is information risk. This is the
risk that managers have private information that would adversely affect the default risk
of a loan. Governance mechanisms can reduce both these risks. Specifically with regard
1For a more detailed discussion of the importance of endogeneity of governance measures see Brown
et al. (2011).
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to agency risk, firms with strong governance should receive a higher rating. Similarly
mechanisms that induce firms to disclose information in a timely and transparent manner
should reduce information risks and therefore improve a firm’s rating.
Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) list three factors to capture these mechanisms; institutional
ownership, block holding, and board structure. Institutional owners may actively monitor
the management actions and if necessary take the required steps to protect shareholder
interests. In this case institutional investors have incentives to monitor and control man-
agement under the active monitoring hypothesis. On the other hand it could be argued
that institutional investors are limited in their motivation to monitor management. Bad
management under this passive monitoring hypothesis would then encourage institutional
investors rather to sell their stock than to initiate corrective action. This effect could vary
in a cross sectional analysis, as it might depend on the corporate governance codex of the
relevant country. Under this hypothesis, the influence of institutional ownership on credit
ratings would depend upon the investment strategy, i.e. voice or exit. Yet neither Bhojraj
& Sengupta (2003) nor Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) investigate this effect.
Concentrated ownership could allow block holders (holding more than five percent of
shares) to exercise undue influence over management to secure benefits that are detri-
mental to other providers of capital. This private benefits hypothesis is distinct from the
wealth redistribution hypothesis discussed below. Under the private benefits hypothesis
block holders are negatively related to ratings. Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) focus on the
conflict between block holders and other stake holders. A contrary effect could be that
block holders, similar to institutional investors, monitor management effectively. This
is the shared benefits hypothesis, which postulates a positive effect of block holders on
ratings.
Corporate boards have the duty of monitoring management performance and protect-
ing shareholder interests. Outside directors bear a reputation cost if a firm’s performance
is poor. This should motivate them to monitor management more closely and thereby
improve ratings. On the other hand, outside directors might be inefficient as they are
selected by management, or because board culture might discourage conflict, thereby
causing a negative relation to bond ratings.
Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) use the percentage of stock held by institutional investors
and the percentage of outside board directors as proxies for institutional ownership and
board independence respectively. They find that both variables effect credit ratings pos-
itively. This supports both the monitoring hypothesis and the benefits of an independent
board.
To capture block ownership they separately use the percentage of stock held by block
holders and the percentage of shares held by institutional investors. Both of these variables
have a significantly negative effect which supports the private benefits hypothesis. Yet
without a control variable to represent a possible wealth redistribution effect, this result
requires further analysis. Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) argue, based on empirical work, that
this effect is irrelevant. If this were the case, then the coefficients of the control variables
would be insignificant. Moreover, even if the argument from Bhojraj & Sengupta(2003)
were correct and wealth transfer effects are irrelevant to determine the creditworthiness of
a firm, rating agencies might still consider them relevant. It might then be similar to an
anchor effect where a classification decision is influenced by an irrelevant factor (Tversky
& Kahneman (1974)).
A further result of Bhajroi & Sengupta (2003) is that governance mechanisms are more
critical for lower rated firms. In the light of the results of Blume et al. (1998), mentioned
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above, who find that ratios are more important for larger firms, this result should be
further investigated. These results are logically compatible, as firm size is a positive
determinant of credit ratings. Therefore larger firms on average have better ratings. Yet
it is necessary to test if the credit rating in the Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) analysis can
be replaced by the independent variable ‘firm size’ to discriminate for the importance of
corporate governance mechanisms.
4.2.2 Wealth redistribution hypothesis
The conflict between bond holders and stock holders is capsulated in the wealth redistri-
bution hypothesis (Barron et al. (2001)). As shown in Section 3 rating changes can affect
bond and stock prices differently. Gompers et al. (2003) find that stronger shareholder
rights correlate with higher firm value. Moreover, anti-takeover governance provisions are
viewed favorably by bondholders yet not by stockholders (Klack et al. (2005)).
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) conduct a more comprehensive analysis and follow the
framework of Standard & Poor’s (2004) to evaluate a firm’s governance structures and
practices. Standard & Poor’s focuses on four major components of governance: ownership
structure and influence, financial shareholder rights and relations, financial transparency,
and board structure and process. Moreover, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) test for possible
wealth redistribution effects which Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) intentionally ignore. They
find that the number of block holders has a negative impact on credit ratings this is
consistent with Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) results but also with the wealth redistribution
hypothesis. Furthermore, their measure of shareholder rights — a score counting single
shareholder rights — is negatively related to credit ratings. This suggests that greater
shareholder rights are negative for credit ratings and supports the wealth redistribution
hypothesis.
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) further find a positive influence for their measures
of financial transparency and board independence and expertise. The results on board
structure are also consistent with the results of Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003). In conclusion,
Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence
that corporate default probability depends on governance mechanisms.
4.2.3 Measuring management quality
Blume et al. (1998) and Amato & Furfine (2004) employ the β of market models to
proxy for management quality. Moreover, Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) use cumulative
stock returns and the market model β. Cumulative stock returns are almost unique as a
determinant of credit ratings. Its use as a control variable may be considered unusual, as
Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) are uncertain about its relationship to credit ratings.
The results of Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) highlight the unclear influence of β and
cumulative stock returns. In a regression without measures of concentrated ownership
both variables have an insignificant influence on credit ratings. This is in contrast to
Blume et al. (1998) and Amato & Furfine (2004) who find a significantly negative relation
for the β. In the regression that includes block ownership the β is significantly negative
and in the regression with the percentage of institutional owned shares it is significantly
positive (the coefficient of cumulative stock returns shows the exact opposite behaviour).
Variables derived from market models therefore seem inappropriate to capture manage-
ment quality, as its effect is not understood. The results could also imply that governance
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mechanisms that monitor management behaviour are more important for credit ratings
than measures of management quality.
4.3 Macroeconomic determinants
Rating Agencies declare that they employ a rating through-the-cycle as opposed to a
more point-in-time perspective (e.g. Merton-type models (Gonzales et al. (2004))), to
avoid short term business cycle effects while assessing the creditworthiness of corporations
(Standard & Poor’s (2002)). But it is empirically observed that agency ratings and the
business cycle do correlate (Amato & Furfine (2004), Kim & Sohn (2008), Feng et al.
(2008)).
4.3.1 Observed decline in US debt
Blume et al. (1998) argue that an — at that time — observed increase in downgrades by
rating agencies is due to more stringent standards in rating assessment. Specifically they
find that in a panel regression intercepts for each year show a constant decline over time.
This causes the panel model to underpredict ratings in the future, suggesting that rating
standards have become more stringent. Amato & Furfine (2004) can reproduce this result
and attribute the observed stronger trend (in comparison to Blume et al. (1998)) to the
fact that they also employed speculative grade ratings.
In order to tackle two possible criticisms, Blume et al. (1998) test the robustness of the
results. The first for them is their assumption that the slope coefficients remain constant
over time. Yet, in year by year regressions, the intercepts still decline over time and the
slope coefficients vary little and are similar to those in the panel model. Moreover, they
find no trend in the independent variables (except for market value, which increases).
The second objection they consider is that there could be crucial omitted variables that
caused the decline. They show that firms that had no rating change over time on average
improved the factors that determine their credit ratings to counter the objection. Never-
theless, omitted variables might be found in the set of corporate governance variables used
by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) or the macroeconomic variables employed by Amato &
Furfine (2004).
Jorion et al. (2009) suggest that the observations of Blume et al. (1998) are due to
a decline in accounting quality. Specifically, accounting information of investment grade
firms has reduced in quality over time. In line with these results Helfin et al. (2011) find
that higher annual report disclosures improve credit ratings.
4.3.2 Ratings through the cycle
Amato & Furfine (2004) show empirically that the observed decrease in credit quality
might be due to macroeconomic effects of the business cycle. Nevertheless they claim to
find no evidence that ratings are unduly influenced by the business cycle, and agencies
therefore achieve a form of rating stability.
Specifically, they advance the Blume et al. (1998) analysis by performing three further
regressions in which they replace the time dummies with a linear trend and alternatively
with an indicator for expansion and recession (the NBER recession indicator), and two
indicators for the state of the economy (the output growth gap and a discrete measure
of the output gap). The linear trend is significant which is consistent with the behaviour
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of the time variables and therefore with the claim that rating standards have become
more stringent. Furthermore, the macroeconomic measures are mostly insignificant which
would confirm the agencies’ claim that they see through the cycle. Yet, in a further
regression with the time series of the financial means, the linear trend is also insignificant.
This result somewhat undermines the findings of Blume et al. (1998). Moreover, they
find that the predictive power of the time dummy model is similar to that with a linear
trend and cyclical variables.
They subject their results to the possible criticism that putting together investment
and speculative grade ratings might result in model misspecification, by performing their
analysis solely for investment grade firms. Their results imply that investment grade firm’s
ratings are more cyclical, as the economic indicators have an significant influence. Here,
similar to the results of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) which imply that ratings determine
the importance of governance mechanisms, the rating classification could be replaced with
firm size. They then question the implicit assumption that each observation represents
an active decision of the rating agency. Alternatively, it could be that due to resource
constraints not every rating is accurate in time (compare with the information content
of credit ratings). In a regression that solely uses new issues and rating changes, one
can be certain that these observations reflect active decisions based on recent research.
For this sample, procyclicality is even stronger than for the investment grade ratings.
Furthermore, the linear trend changes signs and implies that rating standards have become
more lenient rather than more stringent, as Blume et al. (1998) suggest. Yet, as Amato &
Furfine (2004) point out, these results are limited to a subset of the ratings universe, and
therefore the results could be biased, as there are numerous instances of unchanged ratings
where their presence on the agency’s watch list decisions suggests an active decision.
Lo¨ffler (2004) points out that a through-the-cycle approach requires a separation of
permanent and cyclical components of default risk. In a Monte Carlo simulation he
shows how this can cause the observed empirical irregularities of agency ratings. He
(Lo¨ffler (2005)) then goes on to show how the attempt of the agencies to avoid frequent
rating reversals can lead to the empirically observed rating stability, serial dependence
of rating transitions (Gu¨ttler & Raupach (2010)), and the lag of ratings to changes in
issuer’s default risk.
Changes in ratings can empirically be captured by so-called transition-probability
matrices. Feng et al. (2008) use a factor probit model to predict such credit rating
matrices in order to show the effect of the economic cycle on corporate ratings. They
argue that this effect provides evidence that rating agencies, contrary to their claims,
apply the point-in-time perspective. Yet, as Amato & Furfine (2004) point out, the
individual business risk factors of corporations can exhibit cyclical behaviour which may
cause the cyclical behaviour of corporate ratings.
The practical consequences of rating agencies’ through-the-cycle perspective are high-
lighted by Altman & Rijken (2006), arguing that the objectives of rating stability and
default prediction performance can come into conflict. They observe that rating agencies
only partly adjust ratings to the actual credit quality, and less so for upgrades than for
downgrades. This reduces the rating migration probability — confirming the findings
of Amato & Furfine (2004) — and delays rating transitions. Furthermore, compared
to their own point-in-time predictions, this causes the rating agencies’ one-year-horizon
predictions to be less accurate, yet they turn out to be more accurate at larger forecast
horizons.
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More recently Bar-Isaac & Sharpio (2010) develop a model in which rating quality is
dependent on factors affected by the business cycle. These include agencies’ income from
fees and competition on the labour market for analysts. The model is set out to explain
the inaccurate predictions of rating agencies during the 2008 financial crisis, specifically
those of structured finance products empirically observed by Benmelech & Dlugosz (2010).
In summary, financial ratios are essential to determine the creditworthiness of corpor-
ations. Corporate governance characteristics and macroeconomic variables supply addi-
tional relevant information for ratings. In particular, corporate governance mechanisms
that can reduce principal agent problems between management and stakeholders and
effect wealth redistribution from bondholders to shareholders are important. Agencies
attempt to filter out macroeconomic effects by a through-the-cycle approach that seeks
to be independent of the business cycle. Yet this is difficult as it is often unclear which
developments are fundamental and which are short-term. Unfortunately no study up to
now has incorporated all three groups of determinants.
5 Statistical methods used to estimate credit ratings
There are a number of statistical applications to estimate and forecast credit ratings. They
differ in the underlying assumptions they make. Most studies employ a linear regression,
logistic regressions, or discriminate analysis method. These are the standard approaches
to estimate ratings. Furthermore, some studies for example use neuronal networks or
duration and hazard models to forecast rating transitions.
5.1 Classical methods
The ordinary least squares (OLS) and the ordered probit model are ordered methods.
They include the assumption that ratings are ranked. In contrast, the unordered logit
and linear discriminant analysis are not ranked. Ederington (1985) provides a compre-
hensive theoretical comparison of these four methods and how they perform for in-sample
estimation and for out-of-sample prediction.
The OLS regression is an ordered method. An issue arises concerning the definition of
the independent variable (ratings) which is addressed by assigning integers to the ordered
groups. The problem with this approach is that it defines ratings as an interval scale on
which the difference between each two rating classes are the same.
The ordered probit model estimates an unobservable continuous variable (e.g. default
probability), which falls into intervals that correspond to an observable discrete variable
(rating class). Because the intervals can vary in size, the method addresses the scale
problem more adequately than the OLS method. A problem of the two ordered methods
is that variables may influence credit ratings differently across different rating categories.
The multinomial or unordered logit model allows the importance of variables to vary
across ratings. Yet, as the name implies, it does not incorporate the ordered character
of the ratings. An assumption of this model is that the error terms have a Weibull
distribution, unlike an unordered probit model, where the disturbances are assumed to
be normally distributed.
A further unordered method is the multivariate discriminate analysis (MDA). It dis-
tinguishes itself from the unordered logit model by being a conjoint method. While logit
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and probit model the rating as an independent variable, MDA considers the distribution
parameters of the firm’s characteristics to be dependent on the bond ratings. Unordered
logit and MDA have different basic assumptions but use the same classification equation.
In an empirical application Ederington (1985) finds that the unordered logit and
ordered probit outperform the OLS and MDA methods. Moreover, unordered logit
achieves the best fit for in-sample estimation and ordered logit performs best for out-of-
sample prediction. Most newer studies that focus on business or economic issues apply the
ordered logit method (e.g. Blume et al. (1998), Amato & Furfine (2004), and Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2006)). Intuitively it is more appropriate due to its a priori assumptions to
model ratings than the other methods listed above. It assumes the ordered structure of
the ratings but it can also adjust to the specific features of the rating scale. Nevertheless,
it assumes a constant influence of variables across all rating categories. Yet, as seen above
in Section 4, the influence of individual factors vary across rating classes, in particular
between investment and speculative grades. Furthermore, the ordered probit panel re-
gression assumes an point-in-time perspective instead of the through-the-cycle approach,
that is employed by rating agencies (Altman & Rijken (2004)). This is problematic if the
probit method is used to forecast rating changes as in Amato & Furfine (2004). In other
rating transition studies it is common to use forms of duration or hazard models (Du &
Suo (2005) and Koopman et al. (2008)). Yet, due to its economic significance, a large
number of studies have employed further methods to predict ratings.
5.2 Learning methods
In principal the classification of a credit rating to a given set of firm specific variables can
be regarded as a mere categorisation problem. In this sense, methods can be ’trained’
on a sample of ratings and corresponding financial data. These so called learning or
artificial intelligence methods can then be used in forecasting exercises. For instance,
within neuronal networks learning is defined as the search for the weights to produce the
best fit with the given training data (Kwon et al. (1997)). Most of these studies are not
discussed within the business or economic research but in the context of the development
and application of alternative methods in computer science. These are methods such
as the already mentioned neuronal networks (Dutta & Shekhar (1988) and Kwon et al.
(1997)), support vector machines (SVM) (Huang et al. (2004), Ha¨rdle et al. (2005), Ahn
et al. (2005), Cao et al. (2006), Chen & Shih (2006), Lee (2007), and Ye et al. (2008)),
fuzzy logic (Shin et al. (2004), Liu & Liu (2005)), and pi-grammatical evolution (Brabazon
& O’Neill (2008)).
Overall, it is important to consider the a priori knowledge on ratings (ordered and
ordinal scale) while selecting a statistical method to estimate or predict ratings. Yet the
ordered probit model has two difficulties. One is the variation of influence of determinants
over rating classes. The other is its implicit point-in-time perspective approach while
forecasting rating transitions. Studies using so-called ‘learning methods’ are usually not
discussed in an economic or business context.
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6 Rating transitions
Similar to the estimation of credit ratings is the estimation and prediction of credit rating
changes. A general difference in these two approaches is that studies that forecast rating
changes usually condition their forecasts on prior rating.
Some studies mentioned above (e.g. Amato & Furfine (2004)) incorporated rating
transition predictions based on firm specific factors. Some studies solely rely on a set of
more general predictors. Rating transition matrices (or some times migration matrices)
are used, that estimate transition probabilities. Further studies investigate the empirical
properties of transition probabilities and what determines them.
6.1 Rating transition matrices
Transition matrices are at the centre of modern risk management, as transition probab-
ilities are a crucial component of many credit risk models (Lando & Skødeberg (2002)).
Risk is measured using the distribution of rating transitions for the firms (bonds) in a
given portfolio.
In Nickel et al. (2002) the assumption is made that a constant transition probability
pij exists that reflects the likelihood in a given time period (usually a year) that a rating
from class i will change to class j. They can, in the simplest way, be estimated by dividing
the number of firms (or bonds) that change from i in time period t to j in t + 1 with
the total number of firms in class i in at t. This is an unconditional estimation, where
the transition matrix is made up by the pij. A common property of transition matrices
is that they are diagonally dominated, i.e. most ratings do not change and those that do,
do so only over one or a few notches (Nickel et al. (2000), Lando & Skødeberg (2002),
Kim & Sohn (2008)).
Nickel et al. (2000) estimate conditional and unconditional transition matrices based
on S&P’s ratings from 1970 to 1997. They find that the precision of probability estimation
for lower rated bonds is reduced, as there are fewer speculative bonds and higher volatility
in the unconditional transition matrix. Estimating conditioned transition matrices they
further find that transition probabilities are determined by the state of the business cycle,
the regional origin of the issuer, and the issuers industry.
Transition matrices are widely used in rating studies (e.g. Lando & Skødeberg (2002),
Kim & Sohn (2008), and Koopman et al. (2008)). Nickel et al. (2000) implicitly assume
that rating transitions probabilities are produced by a Markov–process, i.e. all ratings in
a category have the same up and downgrade probabilities.
6.2 Duration and momentum effects
In order to produce more efficient estimates of transition matrices, Lando & Skødeberg
(2002), Du & Suo (2005), and Koopman et al. (2008) employ continuous-time estimations
of transition probabilities. That is, instead of yearly transition rates they consider monthly
(Lando & Skødeberg (2002) and Du & Suo (2005)) and even daily (Koopman et al.
(2008)) observations. Lando & Skødeberg (2002) motivate this procedure by the fact that
observations for large transitions are rare or do not occur at all. For example, AAA to D
transitions are not observed in one year, but a bond or firm can still in the time of one year
be downgraded from AAA to A and from A to D. In contrast to discrete-time methods,
continuous-time methods capture effects like this one. Moreover, they test credit rating
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transitions for so called non-Markov effects, in particular duration and momentum. In a
Markov-chain a transition probability depends solely on the current state an object is in
and not on how it reached it or how long it has been in that state. In terms of rating
transitions that would mean that the probability of, for instance, an AA rated bond to be
downgraded does not depend on how long it has been rated AA (duration) or if it reached
its state through a down- or upgrade (momentum).
Lando & Skødeberg (2002) and Du & Suo (2005) find empirical evidence for both
momentum and duration effects. Specifically, Lando & Skødeberg (2002) find a strong
downgrade momentum and only significant upgrade momentum for lower rated bonds.
This means that a previous downgrade increases the probability to be downgraded again,
but the equivalent for upgrades only holds for lower rated bonds. Furthermore, with
respect to duration, the longer a firm occupies a rating class the less likely it will be up-
or downgraded.
The asymmetric effect measured for momentum fits together with the results of Jorion
& Zhang (2007) with regard to the information content of credit ratings (see Section 3).
Part of the price adjustment process around rating changes might include the expectations
of market participants of further reclassifications. Furthermore, the reluctancy of agencies
to issue an upgrade shortly after a downgrade (Altman & Rijken (2006)) and the higher
possibility of a further downgrade might contribute to the observed asymmetric price
adjustments that are empirically observed.
In total, rating transition probabilities are often estimated using rating transition
matrices. These differ over the business cycle, industries, and the regional origin of the
issuer. Rating transitions furthermore exhibit non-Markov effects, i.e. they do not solely
depend on the current state of the rating.
7 Conclusion
This paper reviews the empirical work conducted on credit ratings in the context of
international capital markets. We highlight three lines of research within this field and
how they interact with each other. Furthermore, we show how the implications of each
individual line are crucial to understand the results in other fields.
The first line of research explores the information content of credit ratings and their
relationship to corporate default. The results highlight the ordinal character of the rating
scale. Differences in rating classes do not correspond to equivalent differences in default
probability. This has important implications for the two second lines of research, the in-
formation content of ratings with regard to capital market reactions and the determinants
of credit ratings.
The relevance of credit ratings changes for capital markets, i.e. the efficient market hy-
pothesis, can only be measured effectively if they are conditioned on the respective change
in default probability. Moreover, market reactions around rating changes are asymmet-
rical. Specifically, markets react stronger to downgrades than to upgrades (even after
incorporating the corresponding default probability). This discrepancy might have mul-
tiple reasons. It might be caused by the way rating agencies operate or specific features of
the market for ratings. On the other hand it might be caused by the behaviour of corpor-
ations and how they release relevant information. One important feature of the agencies’
approach that might cause the asymmetrical information content of credit ratings is the so
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called through-the-cycle method. Rating agencies try to estimate the long term creditwor-
thiness of a corporation independent of short-term business cycle effects. Nevertheless,
ratings do correlate with the business cycle. Therefore macroeconomic variables along
with financial ratios and corporate governance characteristics are determinants of credit
ratings.
The third line of research highlights the relationship of financial statements and
credit ratings. Financial statements form the core element of determining credit rat-
ings. Moreover, corporate governance mechanisms that can reduce principal agent prob-
lems between management and stakeholders and effect possible wealth redistribution from
bondholders to shareholders are relevant to determine the creditworthiness of a corpora-
tion. The issue of choosing a statistical method again depends on the ordered and ordinal
structure of the rating scale. Most recent studies therefore employ an ordered probit
approach. It is ordered like the rating scale and can incorporate its ordinal character.
Yet there are two potential deficiencies. First, the method does not allow for the varying
influence of variables over different classes of ratings. This is problematic as the influ-
ence of corporate governance mechanisms and macroeconomic variables depends on the
rating class. Second, in particular with respect to predicting rating changes, a panel
regression assumes a point-in-time approach instead of the rating agencies’ through-the-
cycle method. Therefore employing the probit panel approach to credit rating change
predictions might produce inaccurate results.
Studies to estimate and predict credit rating transitions probabilities and rating trans-
itions employ rating transition matrices and duration methods. They find that rating
probabilities depend on the state of the business cycle, its industry, and on the regional
origin of the issuer. Moreover, rating transitions depend on the length a rating has spent
in one rating class and how it reached that class (via up- or downgrade). More specifically,
a firm that has recently been downgraded is more likely to be downgraded again. This
finding might again be caused by the agencies’ rating procedures.
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